Il secolo americano

If US do not meet the Neocons requirements, America will lose a global security order that is uniquely friendly to American principles and prosperity .

For the first time in 15 years, the 2001 defence budget may reflect a modest real increase in U.S. defence spending, for  G.W.Bush administration the defence budget should be increased to 4% of the gross domestic product.

The lowest level budget was accomplished during Clinton’s administrations, the spending level decreased from $339 billion to $277 billion in 1996 .

The military reforms, reform the army, stop the decreasement of nuclear weapons, and the reform the CIA as well; in fact the intelligence services are basically an element of the war on global terrorism.

The struggle against the nuclear weapons reduction is one of the Neocon’s topics. They tried to avoid the nuclear weapon reduction since the START agreements. Now US withdrew itself from  the ABM treaty too, it was signed with USSR in 1972. In fact the ABM project was one of the main topics of Bush administration  before 9/11.

To carry out these core missions, US needs to provide sufficient force and budgetary allocations. In particular US must:

 • Maintain nuclear strategic superiority, basing the US nuclear deterrent upon a global, nuclear net assessment that weighs the full range of current and emerging threats, not merely than US-USSR balance.

• restore the personnel strength of today’s force to roughly the levels anticipated in

  the “Base Force” outlined by the Bush Administration, an increase in active-duty strength

  from 1.4 million to 1.6 million.

• reposition US forces to respond to 21st century strategic realities by shifting

  permanently-based forces to Southeast Europe and Southeast Asia, and by changing naval

  deployment patterns to reflect growing U.S. strategic concerns in East Asia.

 War in Iraq. Why and Why now ?

 At this moment terrorism is the U.S. biggest enemy. For G.W.Bush administration US could not avoid the clash with global terrorism, it concerns, within G.W.Bush’s vision of the world, a clash between good and evil. Strength is the only language that the middle east country can understand,  US has to attack that country because they support global terrorism.

 “…[the terrorists]  they benefit from State sponsorship, they can form alliance with governments hostile to US…”

 For Bush administration the terrorist acts “…are a part of a coordinated long- term strategy in pursuit of political agenda shared by a broad-based and determined enemy…” .

So, that is why US has to leave the realistic foreign policy of the past years, they have to defeat its enemies with prevent attacks.

 If  we add all the elements of the Neocons doctrine, it is easy to understand why US started the Iraq war a second time.

Iraq is in the middle of a geo-strategic area, it is one of the biggest oil makers in the world, and the Bush administration believed (…and believe now…) it was linked to the Bin Laden terrorist net.

Moreover, US believed that Saddam owned weapons of mass destruction, and with that weapons he could attack US territory and their allies.

The overthrow of Saddam’s regime could bring US to the middle of the Middle-East. It can set up a “democracy” that could be an example for the other middle-east countries, and moreover, the  Saddam regime ( according to the G.W.Bush administration) overthrow could be a big defeat of global terrorism. Most of the Bush advisers believe that the Iraq war is one of the most important steps to the defeat of terrorism “…Without the war to remove Saddam, it’s likely that the counter terrorism efforts of allied intelligence and security service in the Muslim world will diminish, if not end…” .

 But the aim of this essay is not to understand if the Iraq war can make the world safer, nor to understand if the Iraq war has been the right answer to Saddam’s brutal dictatorship, it is to analyse  why U.S. has decided to start a war  and why now .

I think that we can find most of the answers analysing the Neocons belief.

For me, the decision to start the second Iraq war did not took place after 9/11, but it has been on the Neocons minds for a long time, and they just needed a catastrophic event to let the war take place

 “…further the process of transformation, even if it brings revolutionary change, is likely to be a long one, absent some catastrophic and catalysing event- like a new Pearl Harbour…” .

 9/11 was the perfect event to act, the threat of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction were the “perfect” topics to start a war on Iraq.

The main topics used by G.W.Bush administration to attack Iraq was the link between Al Quaeda and Iraq, and the weapons of  mass destruction owned by Saddam.

The Terrorist attacks on September 11th , and the US military response in Afghanistan against Al Quaeda terrorist organizations and the Taliban militia that harboured it, led to a sharper focus on the Iraq problem.

The attack on the World Trade Centre and Pentagon, carried out by Al Quaeda operatives trained,  led from their bases in Afghanistan, demonstrated the threat posed by terrorists who could seek safe haven in rouge nations with potential access to weapons of mass destruction.

As President Bush said in his January 2002 State of the Union Address “…States like these and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. They could provide these arms to terrorist, giving them the means to match their hatred. They could attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the United States. In any of these cases, the price of indifference would be catastrophic…”  .

For almost one year (2002-2003) UN had tried to avoid the second war in Iraq. It set up an inspections system that could check if Saddam had weapon of mass destruction, but for Us the inspections were a complete failure. However, it is not the aim of this assay to analyse  the inspections “failure”.

On November 8th  the Security Council of UN approved Resolution 1441 to address “the threat Iraq’s non compliance with Council Resolution, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles poses to international peace and security” ; the Resolution was a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations under relevant resolutions of the Council.

But for President G.W.Bush, UN’s resolution was a complete failure, Saddam would not stop  producing weapons of mass destruction and would continue to violate the UN resolutions.

That is why US  should attack, for Us administration, Iraq as soon as possible, it is believed to be a threat to US and its allies.

US wanted overthrow Saddam and set up a Democracy in Iraq, the world would have been safer.

The weapons of mass destruction were the perfect pretext to attack Iraq and US did everything they could to show Saddam had them.

So, the Secretary of State,Collin Powel, on February 5th 2003, went to UN to show that Iraq possessed WMD, while at the time, coalition forces in Iraq continued to search for WMD sites, but any sort of weapons of mass destruction has not been discovered yet.

That kind of weapon could arrive in the hands of terrorist groups, in fact regimes like Syria, Iran and Iraq can provide WMD to Al Quaeda terrorists. So, for Bush administration to avoid any kind of attack US has to destroy that kind of regime and  terrorism.

The “best” way is an anticipatory self defence against terrorism and the rouge states that harbour it.

The anticipatory self defence was used in Libya, Panama and Afghanistan, to preserve the American interests and security, so it was not the first time the US used it as a means to protect itself. A preventive attack has served as justification for strikes against Iraq in the decade preceding March 2003. So Iraq could not be seen as an unusual case, but it could also be seen like the beginning of a new international “ relations” age. It‘s clear that 9/11 and the Global war on terrorism started a new historical period, the multilateralism and the UN system of rules to preserve the global peace and to resolve the “ problems” among the Nations, will be replaced by an “Anticipatory Self Defence” (preventive attack) made by US with the support of ad hoc coalitions .

This new kind of  international relations can be summarized in G.W.Bush’s words at West Point Academy in 2002 “…if we wait for threats to fully materialize, we will have waited too long…”   

 The Secretary of Defence D.Rumsfeld, was one of the biggest supporters of the war and  most of the Bush advisors believed that the unsuccessful overthrow of Saddam during “Desert Storm” was one of the US biggest mistakes; like R.Perle said “…was so clear that is something was not done that Saddam was going to come to emerge the survivor who had outlasted the U.N…so it was urgent to deal with Iraq, and we set  a course of dealing with Iraq…” .

So, for the G:W.Bush administration, something should have been done a long time ago, during the first Iraq war, and if now US is “threatened” by Saddam, it is just from the weaknesses of the past administrations and the U.N’s weakness.

“…the fact that we tollered the expulsion of the inspector was a tribute to weak leadership at the time that that took place…”

 However not all Bush administration members and CIA members agreed with the Iraq war. Whitin G.W.Bush administration there were people, like the Secretary of State C.Powel, that had more than one doubt about the war on Iraq.

 There is another topic that could be one of the means of war on Iraq, it is the role that China will have in the world in the coming years. Reading  “Our Ambivalent China Policy”   by G. Schmitt, we can understand that the war in Iraq was made also to provide to US more control on South-East Asia, and to limit the rising of China.

It is most likely China will be a super power in a few years. It will be on the same level as US both in economical and military power; US, how I wrote above, have to place any efforts into avoiding the rise of other world powers in South-East Asia. Since the beginning of the 20th century, US has tried to avoid other powers having control on South-East Asia, and the “Open Door” doctrine (1899) is just an example of that aim. That is why we can think the war in Iraq occurred to prevent the spread of China’s power too .

 “…Next, China's extensive effort over the past few years to  create an anti-hegemonic bloc--that is, an anti-US. bloc--blew apart. Within days of September 11, Moscow had cast its lot with Washington, as did the various "stans" of  Asia, including Beijing's longtime friend Pakistan. The United States now had troops and bases at China's backdoor. Add to his the new military-to-military ties between the United  States and the Philippines, and the growing cooperation between Washington and New Delhi, and Chinese strategic thinkers had to wonder whether America's war on terrorism  wasn't just an excuse to tighten the security noose around Beijing's neck…” .

 Conclusions

 I believe that is too early to find the real means for  war on Iraq, the war is still taking place, is it difficult to analyse the historical events when they are taking place. In a few of years we are going to have more answers to question of why G.W.Bush waged the war on Iraq in 2003.  I believe that we can not say that the war in Iraq was just to have the control of one of the biggest oil producing countries in the world, there are a lot of reasons behind that war.

I think we have to understand the Neocons belief to understand, as well we can, the real means of  the Iraq war. The Neocons belief was started 30 years ago, it is made up of by different topics, and just analysing them we understand why US for the second time waged war on Iraq. Maybe the G.W.Bush administration has started a new historical age and maybe not, we cannot say that now. It has change the way to lead the world and it has set up new kind of international relations.

I believe it is not the right way to lead the world and to make the world more safe. The war in Iraq did not defeat terrorism, it did not bring democracy to the Middle-East, and the “Coalition of the Willing” did not find any kind of weapons.

I think that a brutal dictatorship like Saddam’s and terrorists like Bin Laden are not in the same    “battle field”. Moreover, for me US is making the same mistake that they did during the Cold War. Now in the world there is more than one kind of  terrorism, like there was more than one kind of Communism. We have to be able to understand the differences between all kind of terrorism in the Middle-East and the differences between terrorism and dictatorships like Saddam’s.

Saddam regime was not a Islamic fundamentalist regime, we can describe his regime as Fascist one, there is more than one big difference between Saddam and Islamic terrorists like Bin Laden. That is why I believe that the policies of G.W.Bush administration are not the right way to defeat terrorism and they are not the right way to “bring” around world democracy.

 

Conclusions

 

I believe that is too early to find the real means for  war on Iraq, the war is still taking place, is it difficult to analyse the historical events when they are taking place.

In a few of years we are going to have more answers to question of why G.W.Bush waged the war on Iraq in 2003.

I believe that we can not say that the war in Iraq was just to have the control of one of the biggest oil producing countries in the world, there are a lot of reasons behind that war.

I think we have to understand the Neocons belief to understand, as well we can, the real means of  the Iraq war.

The Neocons belief was started 30 years ago, it is made up of by different topics, and just analysing them we understand why US for the second time waged war on Iraq.

Maybe the G.W.Bush administration has started a new historical age and maybe not, we cannot say that now. It has change the way to lead the world and it has set up new kind of international relations.

I believe it is not the right way to lead the world and to make the world more safe. The war in Iraq did not defeat terrorism, it did not bring democracy to the Middle-East, and the “Coalition of the Willing” did not find any kind of weapons.

I think that a brutal dictatorship like Saddam’s and terrorists like Bin Laden are not in the same    “battle field”. Moreover, for me US is making the same mistake that they did during the Cold War. Now in the world there is more than one kind of  terrorism, like there was more than one kind of Communism. We have to be able to understand the differences between all kind of terrorism in the Middle-East and the differences between terrorism and dictatorships like Saddam’s.

Saddam regime was not a Islamic fundamentalist regime, we can describe his regime as Fascist one, there is more than one big difference between Saddam and Islamic terrorists like Bin Laden.

That is why I believe that the policies of G.W.Bush administration are not the right way to defeat terrorism and they are not the right way to “bring” around world democracy.

a cura di Guido Bassi

In this essay I will try to explain and analyse the “struggle”, within the Soviet Union administration  that took place after Lenin’s death in 1924.<?xml:namespace prefix = o ns = "urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:office" />

After the death of the sovietic leader, the soviet leadership split itself on the issue of “Permanent Revolution” supported by Trotsky, and the “Revolution in one country” supported by Stalin.

The struggle between Stalin and Trotsky, is the most known inside the Soviet leadership. In fact since 1923, this struggle involved other political characters, like Kamenev and Zinoviev. The “Triumvirate”, made by Stalin, Zinoviev and Kamenev, made a strong opposition to the Trotsky theories. The Triumvirate split in 1925 and Zinoviev and Kamenev joined Trotsky in the struggle against Stalin.

But this struggle was not just a doctrinal and philosophical issue, it does not concern just an analysis about Marx’s and Lenin’s ideology, but it concerns a bigger and more important issue as well; the struggle for leadership in the USSR.

Reading the Trostky and Stalin opinions, we can understand not only the ideas they had about spreading of socialism abroad, but we can also see how the power mechanisms worked in the early Soviet Union and what they thought about the mass role and power management.

Reading the paper about the struggle between Stalin and Trotsky, we can see that the Bolshevik party was not monolitic.There was a big opposition, especially a left one, to Stalin leadership. The symbol of that opposition was Trotsky and his “Permanent Revolution” theory. This opposition did not come from the people opposite to Marxism, but the people that were inspired by it, and that were scared by the Stalin interpretation of Marxism, and by the Stalin application of the power.

 

As I said above, the main issue on which the Soviet leaders “fought” in the early 1920’s was the idea of how to spread the Socialist revolution and the socialist way of life to the world capitalist countries, especially to the Europe.

We can understand by reading the Lenin paper, that Marx’s ideas have been revisited by him, especially the idea about the conditions for Socialism.

According to Marx the human development has to pass through five steps: 1) Primitive communal  or clan society 2) Slave holding society 3) Feudalism 4) Capitalism 5) Socialism.

It’s not the aim of this essay to analyse the Marx theory, but we have to know that according to Marx, the French Revolution represented the mile stone that shifted the European society from feudalism to capitalism.

For Marx, Socialism could only take place in a country with a strong and well developed capitalist system, that country was not Russia.[1]

Lenin and, some years later, Stalin as well, revisited the Marx’s ideas.

For them and, especially for Lenin, it was possible to apply socialism in Russia even if Russia was not a capitalist country. The proletariat of that country had to organized a socialist production, and then stand up against the rest of  the capitalistic world.

 

“…Lenin, himself a genius and a follower of Engel and Marx, should have understood the new possibilities of the proletarian revolution under the new condition of capitalist development and thus establish the truth that victory of Socialism in one country alone is possible…”[2]  

 

Once the Socialist Revolution had taken place and the Proletarian Dictatorship had been established, a professional class of revolutionary people would have had to lead the Socialist revolution abroad. Lenin, and Stalin as well, insisted upon a strongly centralized party, without autonomy for national or other component groups. He demanded strong authority at the top, by which the central committee would determine the doctrine (or the party line) and control personnel at all levels of the organization. 

But the spreading of socialism could be made just when the socialism in Russia  had been consolidated. The Revolution must be lead by Sovietic leadership and not by the proletarian world mass.

The conception of the revolution that is known with the name of “Revolution in one country” was extremely elitaristic, it did not leave space for the proletarian mass like leader of the socialist revolution abroad, it reflected the autocratic power conception that Stalin and Lenin had.

Stalin, quoting selectively from Lenin’s writing, advocated “Socialism in one country” was possible to built before that international revolution took place.[3]

 

Trotsky had a different conception of the Russia situation, power, and the spreading of the revolution. He was in disagreement with the “Revolution in one Country” theory, in fact he belived in the”Permanent Revolution” theory, an incessant drive for proletarian objectives on all fronts in all part of the world[4]

Trotsky believed that Russia was not “landed” to the real socialism, like Zinoviev says “…I feel that the thing here is really the attempt of certain comrades to declare that the NEP is socialism…the assertion that the NEP is not socialism also seems to me indisputable…”[5]. To carry out a socialist state, Russia needed the help and the support of all the proletarian world, it especially needed the support of  the West Europe proletarian mass. Without this support the revolution would have degenerated into a bourgeois state.

So, for Trotsky, the proletarian mass should lead the revolution around the world and not a professional class of revolutionary people like Lenin and Stalin said. 

Moreover the revolution should be made as soon as possible. In fact, just with the support of all proletarian mass around the world, Socialism could be established.

 

“…real progress of a socialist economy in Russia will become possible only after the victory of the proletariat in the major European countries…”[6].

 

So there were huge differences between the two soviet theory’s leaders, Trotsky’s and Stalin’s ideas about who, when, and how developed the revolution abroad should be were completely different.

The “Permanent Revolution” theory was less elitaristic than the Stalin one, according to Trotsky the revolution had to come from below, it should be lead by the people, by the mass.

But we know the Stalin theory won, the theory of “Socialism in one country” was accepted as official party policy in 1925 at the 14^th party congress. Stalin imposed, a revolution from above, composed by a forced industrialization, collectivisation and a strong leadership that did not leave space to the oppositions[7].

According to Daniels[8] the Trotsky leadership would have made a difference in the social and cultural field, or in the foreign relation, we do not know if it would has been true, but I think that the Trotsky idea of socialism and revolution was more democratic than Stalin idea.

 

But the struggle concerning the best way to spread revolution, was not just a ideological issue, it  was essentially a struggle for power, the ideological issue was used to delegitimize the politic enemy, to clear the way to the leadership “…Comrade Kamenev has played the role of housemaid to Comrade Trotsky by cleaning the way for him…”.[9]

In all statements, Stalin attacks Trotsky and the left of the Party that was against Stalin. For him they were the enemies of the revolution, the enemies of socialism, but above all they were the enemy of his leadership.

Trotsky worked against the revolution and the soviet proletariat, for Stalin the theory of “Permanent Revolution” was the negation of Lenin’s theory of the proletarian revolution. The “Permanent Revolution” theory showed a “…lack of faith in the revolutionary potentialities of the peasant movement…lack of faith in the strength and capabilities of the proletariat in Russia…”[10] .

The point of reference of  this struggle is Lenin’s theories. What Stalin tried to show was that who ever disagreed with Lenin’s original theories was an enemy of the revolution, was an enemy of the people. I think he tried to show that only he was the legitimate person to succeed Lenin.
The main question was not what is the best theory to spread socialism abroad and to improve the economy and the society of Soviet Union, but who was the “best” person that to lead the Soviet Union into the future, who was the real heiress of Marx and Lenin.

We do not know if Trotsky’s leadership would have been completely different from Stalin’s.

Daniels in his book (Trotsky,  Stalin and Socialism) states that the Trotsky’s leadership could be completely different from Stalin’s leadership.

It could make a difference in the social and cultural area, it could bring more democracy and a deeper political debate, it could leave  space for the opposing idea and theory.

But we can only suppose it, as we know, Trotsky was first exiled in Siberia and the he moved to Mexico where he was killed in 1940.

 

Neocons blame the past administrations to have reduced the strategic defence budget.

"We shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, in order to assure the survival and the success of liberty."<?xml:namespace prefix = o ns = "urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:office" />

Il 20 Gennaio del 1961, dalla collina di Capitol Hill, il Presidente John Kennedy, rivolgendosi alla nazione la esortava a sopportare ogni peso e a pagare qualsiasi prezzo in nome della difesa della libertà.

Gli Stati Uniti orami da 16 anni erano impegnati nella sfida ideologica, economica e militare che aveva come unico e ultimo obiettivo il contenimento dell’ U.R.S.S. e dell’espansione globale del Comunismo. La politica estera americana dal 1947 seguendo le linee tracciate dall’amministrazione Truman cercò di evitare con ogni mezzo che l’influenza sovietica (e dal 1949 anche quella cinese) si espandesse, mettendo a rischio la supremazia americana conquistata grazie allo sforzo bellico nella Seconda Guerra Mondiale.

A inizio anni Sessanta, nel momento in cui la leadership americana iniziava ad erodersi,  e nuovi competitori si affacciavano sullo scenario internazionale, l’amministrazione Kennedy rinnovò, reiterpretandola, la sfida lanciata (o accolta, dipende dai punto di vista) da G.Kenan, proponendo accanto alla strategia del contenimento una più audace e innovativa “missione”: la “Nuova Frontiera”.

La sfida rilanciata dall’amministrazione Kennedy, aveva però un limite strutturale, che allo stesso tempo rappresentava il suo punto di maggior forza ma anche la sua debolezza. L’universalità della missione americana, rifacendosi alla tradizione wilsoniana, non consentiva all’establisment americano distinzioni geo-politiche, tanto meno militari. Il “gioco a somma zero”, dove il guadagno di una parte (U.S.A.-U.R.S.S.) implicava la perdita di influenza della controparte, non consentiva ai politici americani di interpretare con chiarezza le differenti situazioni geo-politiche e di elaborare, quindi, una risposta adeguata alla situazione che si aveva davanti. Non è difficile intuire come agli occhi delle amministrazioni, Berlino, il Vietnam o l’America Latina rivestissero, quindi, la stessa importanza strategica, e come ognuna di essa fosse di fondamentale importanza per la  propria sicurezza e quella del mondo Occidentale.  L’universalità della missione americana non permetteva eccezioni o distinzioni di nessun genere e fu così che il Vietnam divenne, per l’amministrazione Kennedy, una pedina fondamentale nella lotta al comunismo.

A inizio anni Sessanta “perdere” il Vietnam non avrebbe avuto solamente ripercussioni catastrofiche a livello strategico ma anche psicologico. Già dalla metà degli anni Cinquanta, l’amministrazione Eisenhower si era convita che se il Vietnam del Nord, guidato dal leader comunista Ho Chi Min, avesse allargato la propria influenza sul Vietnam del Sud, governato dal dispotico e corrotto regime di Ngo Dinh Diem, con l’appoggio degli americani, sarebbe stato impossibile evitare un “effetto domino” in tutto il Sud-Est asiatico.

La paura di perdere il Vietnam, il timore di un conseguente “effetto domino” in tutto il Sue-Est asiatico, così come era stata persa la Cina a fine anni Quaranta, spinse gli Stati Uniti a sostituirsi alla Francia nella penisola indocinese, e attraverso il sostegno economico e politico a mantenere in vita il fragile governo del Vietnam del Sud.

La penisola indocinese era stata divisa in diverse entità statuali nel 1954 con gli accordi di Ginevra, che diedero vita, oltre ad un Vietnam del Nord e uno del Sud, al Laos e Cambogia.  Nei due stati, divisi dal 17° parallelo, si sarebbero dovute tenere elezioni politiche entro il 1956 con l’obiettivo di unificare la nazione sotto un unico governo. Nonostante ciò la paura americana di vedere sconfitto l’impopolare e corrotto regime del sud a favore di una vittoria elettorale delle forze comuniste, spinse l’amministrazione Eisenhower a inviare già nella seconda metà degli anni Cinquanta i primi consiglieri militari e i primi aiuti economici al governo di Diem.

Gli aiuti e l’assistenza americana, non sortirono però gli effetti desiderati, il governo di Diem a inizio 1960 era sempre più impopolare, la corruzione dilagava e le riforme in senso democratico sperate e volute dall’amministrazione Kennedy, che nel 1960 aveva vinto le elezioni presidenziali, stentavano a decollare, creando imbarazzo e perplessità tra l’opinione pubblica americana. Oltre ad attraversare una difficile e profonda crisi interna, il Governo Diem era insediato anche dall’esterno. Sempre più forte era, infatti, l’appoggio popolare dato ai Viet Cong, un gruppo di guerriglieri sud-vietnamiti sostenuto dall’Esercito popolare del Vietnam del Nord che lottava, adottando tattiche di guerriglia, per liberare il territori del sud e unificare il paese nel nome del socialismo.

L’impegno americano in Indocina aumentò dunque rapidamente e gia a metà del 1961 il numero dei consiglieri militari americani nel Vietnam del Sud arrivava a 3000.

Le aspettative dell’amministrazione Kennedy continuavano però ad essere tradite dall’ambiguo regime del Vietnam del Sud e fu così che il 1 Novembre 1963 un gruppo di colonnelli dell’ esercito, aiutati e appoggiati dal Dipartimento di Stato Americano, depose e uccise Ngo Dinh Diem, dando vita ad una giunta militare che si proponeva di unificare il paese e sconfiggere definitivamente la guerriglia comunista. Solamente 12 giorni dopo a Dallas il Presidente Kennedy veniva assassinato, lasciando nelle mani del suo successore, il texano Lindon B. Johnson, la difficile situazione indocinese.

Nonostante il cospicuo incremento di consiglieri militari in Vietnam tra, il 1959 e il 1963, non si può parlare di vera e propria guerra. Gli scontri armati tra il personale americano e l’esercito popolare del Vietnam del Nord furono inesistenti, i consiglieri inviati da Kennedy si limitavano, infatti, a supervisionare le operazioni militari a fornire supporto logistico e ad addestrare le truppe sudvietnamite.

A fine 1963 il coinvolgimento americano in Vietnam era, dunque, ancora marginale. La crisi nella penisola indocinese non calamitava ancora l’attenzione dell’opinione pubblica, e gli sforzi effettuati dall’amministrazione Kennedy per tenere nascosto o comunque sminuire il coinvolgimento americano, aumentarono tra il pubblico la percezione che il Vietnam fosse qualcosa di lontano che non gli avrebbe mai riguardati da vicino.

Tutto cambiò una mattina del 7 Agosto 1964 con l’approvazione della “Risoluzione del Golfo del Tonchino”. Tale risoluzione fu, ed è tutt’oggi, una tra le più controverse e dibattute risoluzioni della storia politico-istituzionale americana. Il 7 Agosto il Senato concesse ampio supporto per aumentare il coinvolgimento statunitense nella guerra “come il Presidente riterrà opportuno”. La risoluzione lasciava aperte due questioni di fondamentale importanza: la prima di ordine giuridico. L’escalation militare in Vietnam  non fu preceduta da una formale dichiarazione di guerra del Congresso, la Risoluzione del Golfo del Tonchino, concedeva  si pieni poteri al Presidente ma non rappresentava una dichiarazione di guerra. Il conflitto vietnamita a livello giuridico non poteva essere dunque considerato una guerra, in quanto gli Stati Uniti non elaborarono mai una formale dichiarazione.

La seconda questione sollevata dalla risoluzione del 7 Agosto era di ordine istituzionale. Il Congresso, concedendo al Presidente ampi poteri, rinunciava al proprio diritto costituzionale di controllo della politica estera. In base al Secondo Emendamento della Costituzione, spettava, infatti, ai due rami del Parlamento decidere come se e quando impiegare le forze armate in combattimento. Ma in assenza di una dichiarazione di guerra e grazie alla Risoluzione del Golfo del Tonchino Johnson potè impiegare le forze armate senza essere soggetto a alcun tipo di controllo istituzionale, dando vita ad un escalation militare che in 11 anni provocò più di 50.000 morti tra i soldati americani. 

Tutto aveva avuto origine pochi giorni prima, quando il 31 Luglio 1964 l’incrociatore americano Maddox riprese una missione di ricognizione nel Golfo del Tonchino, che era stata sospesa per sei mesi. Lo scopo era di provocare una reazione da parte delle forze della difesa costiera nordvietnamita, da usare come pretesto per una guerra più ampia. La Maddox subì un danno superficiale ma che fu sufficiente come pretesto per iniziare il conflitto.

La tattica americana funzionò alla perfezione e poco meno di un anno dopo l’incidente, 3.500 US Marines sbarcarono nel Sud unendosi ai 25.000 consiglieri militari.

La strategia militare adottata dal dipartimento della difesa americano si fondava su un intenso bombardamento aereo delle postazioni nordvietnamite e delle installazioni dei Viet Cong, vera spina nel fianco delle truppe americane. L’imponente macchina bellica messa in campo dagli americani non bastò, tuttavia, ad avere ragione dell’agguerrita e ben organizzata resistenza vietnamita. L’illusione del Dipartimento di Stato di poter vincere la guerra in 40 giorni, si scontrò con le pesanti perdite subite dal contingente statunitense. A inizio 1966 le truppe americane in Vietnam salirono alla cifra record di 500.000, una forza spropositata se paragonata all’esercito nordvietnamita.

Il continuo incremento del coinvolgimento militare avvenne mentre l’amministrazione Johnson e il generale W.Wesmoreland assicuravano ripetutamente il pubblico americano che il successivo incremento di truppe avrebbe portato alla vittoria, la “luce alla fine del Tunnel” era ormai ben visibile.

Le ottimistiche convinzioni dell’amministrazione Johnson vennero frantumate la sera del 30 Gennaio 1968, quando nei salotti americani la televisione, strumento ormai fondamentale per condizionare l’opinione pubblica, trasmise le immagini dell’ “Offensiva del Tet”. Le truppe regolari dell’esercito popolare del Vietnam del Nord assieme ai Viet Cong organizzarono un imponente attacco nel sud. Pur non ottenendo alcun successo militare l’offensiva ebbe un forte impatto sul pubblico americano, creando la percezione che la guerra fosse ormai persa e che ogni ulteriore sforzo sarebbe stato inutile a risolvere una crisi iniziata male e conclusasi nel peggiore dei modi. Gli americani non tardarono a esprimere pubblicamente il proprio dolore e contrarietà ad una guerra che stava decimando un’ intera generazione e di cui non si capivano gli obiettivi. Le manifestazioni di opposizione al conflitto si moltiplicarono, dando vita nei campus universitari ad un acceso e spesso violento scontro sulle responsabilità americane, ma soprattutto sull’intera cultura statunitense. La generazione dei “Baby Boomers”, i figli nati dopo la Seconda Guerra Mondiale, diede vita ad un intenso dibattito politico-culturale sugli obiettivi della politica estera americana e sulla società nel suo insieme. La contestazione studentesca, che contemporaneamente dilagava in tutto il mondo, fu rafforzata dalla decisione del Dipartimento di Stato di ristabilire la coscrizione obbligatoria attraverso un sistema che fu chiamato “lotteria di leva”, il quale, attraverso un meccanismo perverso, estraeva a sorte le future reclute.

A fine 1968 ara chiaro che gli Stati Uniti avrebbero potuto vincere la guerra ad un prezzo che la nazione non era disposta a pagare, il tentativo di conquistare “i cuori e le menti” sia a casa che in Vietnam era fallito, spettava al nuovo Presidente R.Nixon trovare una via di uscita dal pantano vietnamita.

Nixon si rese subito conto che la guerra era ormai persa, adesso gli Stati Uniti dovevano riuscire ad ottenere una “pace con onore”. La strategia adottata da Nixon per sganciarsi dal Vietnam fu però estremamente ambivalente. Da un lato intensificò i bombardamenti sul Vietnam del Nord, allargando le operazioni militari anche al Laos e Cambogia, dall’altro iniziò a ridurre il contingente militare americano provando ad ottenere una vietnamizzazione del conflitto. L’obiettivo della vietnamizzazione era di mettere l’esercito sudvietnamita in grado di reggere sempre più lo scontro con l’esercito del Nord. La “Dottrina Nixon” non si limitò solamente ad un intensificazione dei bombardamenti e ad un contemporaneo ritiro, di fondamentale importanza risultarono essere le trattative diplomatiche avviate a fine 1969 con l’U.R.S.S. e soprattutto con la Cina che aveva una forte influenza sul governo comunista del Vietnam del Nord. Avvalendosi della preziosa collaborazione del Segretario di Stato H.Kissinger, Nixon cerco di indurre la Cina a fare pressioni sul Vietnam del Nord e allo stesso tempo cercò di spaccare definitivamente le già difficili relazioni tra la Cina e i sovietici. La diplomazia risultò, quindi, lo strumento più efficace per uscire dal pantano vietnamita, e così a metà 1969 a Parigi iniziarono le trattative tra le parti. Se Nixon fece della diplomazia uno strumento irrinunciabile per risolvere la crisi vietnamita, è però importante sottolineare che negli anni 1970-1973 furono sganciate più bombe sul Vietnam che in tutti gli anni precedenti e che morirono più soldati che durante la presidenza Johnson.

L’accordo di pace tra gli Stati Uniti e il Vietnam venne firmato il 27 Gennaio 1973, Nixon annunciò il ritiro unilaterale delle truppe americane, impegnandosi tuttavia a fornire aiuti economici e materiale militare al Vietnam del Sud. La strategia di Nixon per non perdere il Vietnam risultò comunque inefficace, il Congresso resosi conto del terribile errore fatto nel 1964 con la Risoluzione del Golfo del Tonchino, vietò ulteriori finanziamenti all’azione militare in Indocina e negò a inizio 1975 qualsiasi aiuto economico al Vietnam del Sud.

Fu così che il debole regime sudvietnamita ormai abbandonato, capitolò il 30 Aprile 1975. Il Vietnam del Nord fu annesso a quello del Sud il 2 Luglio 1976 dando vita alla Repubblica Socialista del Vietnam.

La sconfitta militare in Vietnam, la prima subita dagli americani, lasciò una profonda ferita nella cultura americana, esercitando una profonda influenza sulla politica estera americana, sulla strategia da adottare e sui mezzi per contenere l’Unione Sovietica. La politica del Contenimento, che aveva portato gli Stati Uniti in Vietnam, subì sostanziali ripensamenti. Gli americani non sarebbero stati più gli stessi, l’America aveva perso la propria innocenza nella giungla vietnamita.

 

 

 

 

 

Il  Novecento è stato senz'altro il secolo americano. Come non lo era stato il XIX - dominato dalla Gran Bretagna - e come non lo sarà il XXI. Questa sezione è curata da Guido Bassi, esperto in storia degli Stati Uniti, con alcune parti in lingua inglese.